Collaborative Academic Library Digital Collections Post- Cambridge University Press, HathiTrust and Google Decisions on Fair Use by Wu, Michelle M
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2016 
Collaborative Academic Library Digital Collections Post- 
Cambridge University Press, HathiTrust and Google Decisions on 
Fair Use 
Michelle M. Wu 
Georgetown University Law Center, mmw84@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1797 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2838898 
 
J. Copyright Educ. Libr. (2016) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
1 
 
Originally Published in the Journal of Copyright in Education and Libraries, Volume 1 (2016) at 
https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/jcel/article/view/5921/5345 
 
Collaborative Academic Library Digital Collections Post- Cambridge University Press, HaithiTrust and 
Google Decisions on Fair Use 
Michelle M. Wu1 
 
Academic libraries face numerous stressors as they seek to meet the needs of their users through 
technological advances while adhering to copyright laws. This paper seeks to explore one specific 
proposal to balance these interests, the impact of recent decisions on its viability, and the copyright 
challenges that remain after these decisions. 
 
The challenges facing academic law libraries are many, but the three primary ones are budget, demand, 
and misperceptions.  Though actual means and medians of collection expenditures continue to grow,2 
they have failed to keep pace with inflation rates,3 resulting in a net decrease in spending power over 
the last decade. On a different front, student and faculty appetites for multiple formats and 
interdisciplinary research sources continue to expand, placing greater strain on shrinking budgets. 
Exacerbating the effect of both of these is the provision of resources through digital means, resulting in 
the invisibility of the library and the common misperception that libraries are no longer necessary.   
 
Considering this landscape, it may seem odd to propose digitization as a potential solution, as this step 
would make even more resources available online and heighten the division between a library and its 
resources. However, user expectations and habits have made clear that online access is more heavily 
relied upon than other resources,4 and libraries need to meet users where they are to remain relevant.  
This article does not seek to resolve the long-standing tension between use and funding, but instead 
aims to provide some relief for the budgetary and demand issues.      
 
The proposal in question was described at an earlier stage in the Law Library Journal,5 but has evolved 
to one less dependent on the forming of a consortium. At its heart, the proposal is that academic law 
libraries digitize their holdings, share them with one other through a controlled-circulation mechanism, 
and leverage their financial resources more effectively through a collaborative collection development 
and maintenance function.  The first piece is the simplest of the whole, asking participating libraries to 
                                                          
1 Michelle M. Wu is the Associate Dean for Library Services and Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
2 Charles B. Lowry, ARL Budgets After the Great Recession, 2011-13 at http://publications.arl.org/rli282/2  and ARL 
Law Library Statistics at http://www.arlstatistics.org/about/series/law  
3 "Prices of U.S. and Foreign Published Materials." 
http://www.ala.org/alcts/sites/ala.org.alcts/files/content/resources/collect/serials/ppi/LMPI_2014Article.pdf  For 
historical data, see http://www.ala.org/alcts/resources/collect/serials/spi  
4 Michelle M. Wu and Leslie A. Lee, An Empirical Study on the Research and Critical Evaluation Skills of Law 
Students, 31 Legal Reference Services Q. 205-238 (2012). 
5 Michelle M. Wu, Building a Collaborative Digital Collection: A Necessary Evolution in Libraries, 103 L. Lib. J. 527 
(2011). 
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digitize their materials, prioritizing materials that have no online equivalent (primarily monographs). The 
second piece is more challenging, as it requires libraries sharing these digitized resources to do several 
things: remove the print title digitized from circulation and enter its digitized version into a centralized 
repository. The repository would allow circulation of any digital item, but would restrict the number of 
simultaneous users to the number of copies “held” by the repository (i.e., if partner libraries own ten 
copies of a title, the repository would have the authorization to circulate ten copies of the digital version 
at a time, so long as all ten print equivalents are not being circulated).  Any circulation of an item would 
be controlled through an online lending platform like Overdrive6 or  Open Library7, and any digital object 
would be further contained through digital rights management (DRM), limiting the ability to make 
copies, print, or loan the item to someone else.  In other words, the lending mechanism would duplicate 
the existing circulation and interlibrary loan functions of a library, just in digital form.  The proposal itself 
is extendible to other types of libraries or digitization projects, but as each type of library or project has 
unique characteristics, the analysis here will focus on academic law libraries as an example. 
 
Such a solution contemplates on-going reduction of costs in several ways.  Sharing of physical materials 
is costly, once one aggregates the costs of shipping both ways, the personnel required to pull and ship 
materials, and the time lost in shipping.  The sharing of digital materials reduces or eliminates these 
costs. There would no longer be any shipping costs, with circulation accomplished online, nor would 
library personnel need to retrieve or send materials, as all of this could be automated.  Such an 
approach also reduces the likelihood of loss of materials or the time investment in negotiating with 
recalcitrant patrons to return items; online lending platforms enable immediate “reclaiming” of an 
item.8  On the flip side, of course, are the costs of digitization itself, but as only one library would need 
to digitize a title held by many, the costs are less daunting when shared by all partners.  Further, the 
practical reality is that while funders may be reluctant to fund print acquisitions, there are many more 
funding options for digitization. 
 
There would also be a reduction of cost to the researcher. Presently, the novice researcher often only 
searches for online materials, not realizing the treasure trove of resources available only in print. Even 
though discovery platforms allow the simultaneous searching of print and e-resources, the fact that one 
set of resources is full-text while the other only contains basic bibliographic information constrains the 
search.  The digitization of printed materials ensures a level playing field for all resources, regardless of 
their original formats.  All could be searched simultaneously and in an equivalent fashion.  Even the 
expert scholar could see savings in the time necessary to identify the titles necessary to her research 
and in retrieving the item.  There would be even greater savings in the use of special collections, where 
the researcher often has to travel to the owning library’s location to access the resource.  If these 
collections digitized and made available through an online platform, the time and expense of travel may 
be reduced or eliminated. 
                                                          
6 https://www.overdrive.com/.  Description of other platforms can be found in John Novak, eBook Lending 
Platforms, 25 Against the Grain 22-26 (2013). 
7 https://openlibrary.org/  
8 Technologically, this often isn’t a reclaiming but a control mechanism to restrict access to a title.  However, for 
the majority of the user population, it functions the same way. 
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Though many libraries have expressed interest over the years in such a project, almost every 
conversation on the topic has stopped once in-copyright materials come under discussion.  The three 
exceptions are where litigation is unlikely or where there is an accepted exception: orphan works, 
providing digital materials for disabled persons, and limited-access archiving.  It is not that librarians 
doubt that building and using such a collection is fair use, but their (and their Universities’) anticipation 
of the threats of litigation and the associated costs have stunted academic library exploration into more 
broadly useful digital collections. 
 
The recent decisions in Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, and 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google all breathe life into efforts to build a working collaborative digital library, 
removing some perceived barriers, and allowing libraries to concentrate on narrower copyright issues.  
This article will provide readers with a brief review copyright and a description of notable eras within fair 
use for libraries, before advancing to a discussion of the most recent court opinions and their spawning 
of a new era. 
 
Part I: Copyright and Fair Use 
 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution reads: 
 
Congress shall have the power…[t]o promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries. 
 
Known as the Copyright Clause, this declaration shows that copyright was always a means to an end, not 
an end in and of itself.  Granting rights to authors to protect their works was seen as necessary to ensure 
continued creative output,9 and despite research showing that neither remuneration nor a long term of 
protection is necessary for rapid and robust growth of the creative commons,10 this general principle 
remains the motivating force for many copyright laws. 
 
In furtherance of the Copyright Clause, then, Congress undertook the drafting of several copyright acts, 
the most extensive of which is the one still in effect today, albeit in somewhat altered form: the 
Copyright Act of 1976. The act’s framework is largely structured to favor the copyright owner, and the 
broadest of its provisions can be found in the granting of exclusive rights to copyright owners for limited 
times, captured in in section 106 and 106A. These authors’ rights are then followed by (mostly) narrow 
exclusions in sections 107 through 122.  Section 107 is notable in these exclusions, as its protections are 
not narrowly circumscribed.  It is drafted in terms as broad as the original grant.  Section 107 speaks to 
                                                          
9 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §1.03 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) 
10 Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 William & Mary L. Rev. 513  
at 513 (2009) (“…the desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic 
incentive. Psychological and sociological concepts can do more to explain creative impulses than classical 
economics.”) 
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fair use, an affirmative defense to copyright infringement, permitting uses of copyrighted works in 
conditions that advance societal interests and do not rob the author of the fruits of his labor.  Section 
107 reads:    
 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means 
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
  
(b) The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
 
This language in the first part of the statute is the codification of the common law concept of fair use as 
articulated by Justice Joseph Story in Folsom v. Marsh.11  Though Justice Story set forth the factors, he 
did not did not provide any definitions or weights to any of the factors.  As he himself said,  
 
This is one of those…questions, arising in the administration of civil justice, in which it is not, 
from the peculiar nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory 
conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases…[I]n cases of copyright, 
it is often exceedingly obvious, that the whole substance of one work has been copied from 
another, with slight omissions and formal differences only, which can be treated in no other way 
than as studied evasions; whereas, in other cases, the identity of the two works in substance, 
and the question of piracy, often depend upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in 
one of the materials of the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used; the 
objects of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have 
resorted to the same common sources of information, or to have exercised the same common 
diligence in the selection and arrangement of the materials. Thus, for example, no one can 
doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and 
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it 
is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, 
but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be 
                                                          
11 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841).  
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deemed in law a piracy. A wide interval might, of course, exist between these two extremes, 
calling for great caution and involving great difficulty, where the court is approaching the 
dividing middle line which separates the one from the other.12 
 
In other words, while he could articulate what could be considered, he felt that the very nature of 
intellectual property was too protean to allow for the easy application of rules.  Other courts seemed to 
agree, as between 1841 and 1976, they often cited Folsom but did not follow a consistent formula in 
application.  Congress agreed that flexibility was needed and sought to retain it when it codified the 
concept of fair use.13  In crafting the statutory language, though, Congress inadvertently made an 
already complex concept even more difficult to understand or apply.  First, it delineated a four factor 
test that, while non-exclusive, was easiest to apply if treated as all-inclusive. As law is an institution that 
depends in part upon consistency and precedent, courts are not well equipped to deal with a statute 
that both prescribes a test but provides no instructions for application.  Second, it included an exemplar 
of fair use --- “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use)” --- that could be read as an 
exception to the four factors.  Third, it included in its legislative history the Agreement on Guidelines for 
Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit education Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals.14  
Though this agreement explicitly opens with 
 
The purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum and not the maximum 
standards of educational fair use under Section 107… The parties agree that the conditions 
determining the extent of permissible copying for educational purposes may change in the 
future; that certain types of copying permitted under these guidelines may not be permissible in 
the future; and conversely that in the future other types of copying not permitted under these 
guidelines may be permissible under revised guidelines.  
 
the fact that it contains prohibitions on conduct contradicts the language about minimum standards.  As 
a whole, then, the codification of fair use served to provide no more clarity than Justice Story’s longer 
description of fair use, and in fact, made fair use more difficult to apply than in earlier times.   
 
The statute is often described as being in three parts: the preamble including exemplars of fair use; the 
(non-exclusive) four-pronged test of fair use; and a statement about unpublished works (added in 1992 
to counter the effects of Harper & Row).  Of these, the second part --- the four pronged test --- has 
received the most attention, both by judges and by scholars.  Though there is disagreement as to 
whether there really are four prongs, or only one factor with multiple facets,15 courts continue to 
address all four points as distinct ones in their analyses. 
 
The four factor test, which had been intended to provide a minimum floor for the issues to be 
considered in determining if a use was a fair one, has taken on an entirely different meaning over the 
                                                          
12 Id. at 344-45. 
13 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) 
14 Id. 
15 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 549  at 
617 (2008). 
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years.  It has morphed from a fuzzy test, much like what Justice Story had described, to a rigid 
application of the four factors, and only the four factors.16  The first factor, nature and character of use, 
was relevant insofar as it spoke to the two interests of copyright. Where use was commercial, there was 
a greater likelihood that the use would not be fair.  Copyright laws were intended to support an author’s 
or copyright owner’s ability to reap the rewards of her own work or investment, and commercial use of 
a copyrighted work by someone other than the owner, therefore, ran contrary to this intent.  If the 
nature and character of use, on the other hand, were informative (e.g., news reporting) and non-
commercial, this factor was more likely to weigh towards fair use.  This factor is one of the most 
influential factors, and in recent years has become the most influential factor,17 for reasons that will be 
detailed in later sections. Note that “commercial” is not the same as for-profit, and there are instances 
where an entity can receive direct or indirect rewards from use of a copyrighted work while still being 
seen as non-commercial in nature.18  
 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes a sliding scale of protection applying 
to copyrightable works dependent on their content.  As copyright rewards creativity, more creative 
works are seen as more deserving of copyright protection than others. This concept is supported in 
copyright even beyond the examination of fair use. For example, there are explicit exclusions within 
copyright laws and regulations for categories of works that are not protected (e.g., facts),19 and cases 
have repeatedly limited copyright protection for works that draw heavily on fact or common 
knowledge.20   In fair use assessments, “[the] law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate 
factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”21 Therefore, the less creative the work, the less the use 
will weigh against fair use.  This factor is one of the easiest to evaluate, but is typically not definitive.22  
 
Amount and substantiality is the third factor, and at one time, was as simple to weigh as the second 
factor.  The more of a work that was taken, the more likely the factor would weigh against fair use, and 
there was a time when the taking of an entire work ended the analysis.23  Since the advent of duplicating 
technologies, though, courts have had to adapt their analyses.  Where copying an entire work in an 
analog world would have been infringement, the caching of entire works by a computer (e.g., website) 
to assist in transmission is not seen as infringing on the rights of the copyright owner,24 whether under 
the theory that the reproduction is temporary or under the fair use defense.  In fair use, amount and 
substantiality has become a factor that cannot be evaluated independently.  Instead, it merges with 
                                                          
16 Id. At 561-62. 
17 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715 at 743-744 (2011). 
18 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 at 1264-1267 (2014). 
19 17 U.S.C. §102(b); 37 C.F.R. §202.1. 
20 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990) (limiting protection of basic 
directories); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (limiting protection of forms); Hoehling v. University City Studios, 
Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (noting that scenes a faire are not protected by copyright). 
21 Harper and Row, 471 U.S. 539  at 563. 
22 Supra note 15 at 610. 
23 Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 at 1118 (2000) (“copying an entire 
work militates against a finding of fair use.”) 
24 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright §21:39  
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factor one so that the test is now whether “the amount and substantiality of the portion used ... are 
reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.”25 Since this factor depends on another, it also is 
rarely definitive in resolving a dispute where fair use is raised. 
 
The last factor, market effect, has always been the most difficult to identify and evaluate. While this 
factor is still evolving, courts have generally agreed on some basic guidelines. Nimmer describes the test 
as “whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market” for the original.26 Where the 
defendant’s work substitutes for the copyright owner’s, this factor will weigh heavily against fair use. 
Market effects that are indirect --- such as reducing the market for an author’s work by making a 
popular, stinging parody of it --- generally will not be counted as a market effect for the purposes of this 
analysis. Up until the last decade, this was the most influential factor and predicted in over 95% of the 
cases the outcome of any fair use analysis. 27 
 
The factors, at first glance, seem straightforward even if broad, but the courts, in their interpretation, 
have tended to confuse more than clarify.  In fact, some scholars have criticized the courts heavily for 
seeming to bend the prongs of fair use to whatever ends they seek.    
 
Courts tend first to make a judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair use, and 
then align the four factors to fit that result as best they can.  At base, therefore, the four factors 
fail to drive the analysis, but rather sere as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent 
conclusions.28   
 
Though empirical studies have shown that courts have been less arbitrary than Nimmer suggests,29 they 
have also demonstrated why there continues to be considerable confusion over fair use.  First, the 
Supreme Court has declined to explicitly correct prior interpretations of fair use, even where lower 
courts have split in their application of Supreme Court precedent.  The clearest example of this is in 
Sony, where the Court had stated in dicta, “every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright.”30  Lower courts cite this language repeatedly, and the Supreme Court has had multiple 
opportunities to correct the misapplication of Sony’s statement.  Instead, it has muddled the waters 
further by saying both that the application was wrong but then reiterating the statement that caused 
the confusion in the first place.31 
 
                                                          
25 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586–587 (1994). 
26 Supra note 9 at § 13.05[A] [4]  
27 Supra note 15 at 617. 
28 David Nimmer, “Fairest of them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 Law & Contemp Probs. Winter-Spring 
2003 at 281 
29 Supra note 17 at 721. 
30 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 at 451 (1984). 
31 Supra note 15 at 599-601, describing the Supreme Court’s contradictory statements on commercial effect and 
fair use from Sony through Campbell. 
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With this historical background, libraries’ and universities’ fears of litigation are unsurprising.  Pursuing a 
course of digitization when litigation is likely and the outcome unpredictable increases the potential loss 
to the entity undertaking the action. Not only could universities be held liable for damages for 
infringement plus attorneys’ fees (though these might be mitigated or remitted to $0 by 17 U.S.C. 
504(c)(2)), but if found to have infringed, they would lose access to the digitized works as well their 
investment of time and effort to create those electronic documents.  Without certainty, libraries have 
no safe way forward.   
 
Before reviewing the various fair use eras, it is important to note that two other statutes are relevant 
when talking about libraries and fair use, as they intersect regularly with 107 analyses. These are 
sections 121 (17 USC 121) and section 108 (17 USC 108).  In brief, section 121 recognizes how difficult it 
may be for visually impaired individuals to obtain copies of reading materials in usable formats.  
Therefore, section 121 carves out an exception to entities that provide specialized formats for the blind 
or disabled. Section 108 carves out copyright exceptions, including preservation and interlibrary loan, 
for libraries and archives under certain conditions so long as the entities strictly comply with limits 
placed on the type of reproduction that can be done. While neither of these sections plays a significant 
role in this article, both are necessary to the operations of libraries as they navigate copyright and fair 
use. 
 
The next section will explore the development of fair use and libraries over four different eras. 
 
Part II: Fair use eras 
 
When Congress drafted the Copyright Act of 1976, the specter of technology was already looming. The 
most contentious sections were those where technology was seen to be potential game changers, and 
fair use was one of these sections.32 Photocopiers had been introduced to businesses in the late 1950s 
and were becoming common in libraries and archives in addition to businesses.  The final language of 
the act, along with its legislative history, reflect the drafters’ struggle with technology, especially in light 
of the fact that it was so new that actual impact could not be predicted. Little could they have foreseen 
exactly what an impact technology would make to copyright and fair use.  
 
To better highlight technologically driven advances in fair use, this paper summarizes major 
developments by dividing case law up by eras.  For simplicity’s sake, most eras have been named below 
for the case in the era that sparked the shift that defines that time period.     
 
Pre-Technology Era (pre-1983) 
 
Though photocopiers and other technologies (e.g., recording devices) did exist in this era, they were all 
analog and largely burdensome. For that reason, they are included in the pre-technology stage, despite 
their advances over more manual duplication efforts.  In this era, the analysis of the four factors in any 
                                                          
32 William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law at 351 (2d ed, 1995). 
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case was casual at best.  While there was a slight shift in the approach in 1978, when the current 
Copyright Act (and section 107) went into effect, fair use was a rarely asserted defense.  Libraries did not 
face much scrutiny, and only one relevant case was found. 
 
Williams & Wilkins33  in 1973 involved a publisher suing the library of the National Institutes of Health 
for photocopying articles for their employees.  The library routed a copy of each journal to those 
interested, and upon request, the library would photocopy an article for the requesting researcher.  It 
would not make multiple copies for any researcher, typically limited copies to only one article from any 
given journal issue for any one researcher, and limited the number of pages that it would copy in any 
request.  The library neither monitored the reasons for the requests nor did they require that the 
materials be returned. The court found the use to be fair, as the purpose of the copying was solely for 
the development and dissemination of knowledge, the works copied were factual in nature, the library 
had established reasonable limits on how much could be copied, and there was limited market effect.  
 
The decision was split four to three, appealed to the Supreme Court, and was affirmed due to an equally 
divided Court.  The Copyright Act of 1976 was passed after the Williams case, and two pieces within its 
legislative history make it appear as if the case had had some influence on the development of fair use 
and Congress’ view of it.  The first is the House Report accompanying the legislation, which outlines the 
relationship between 107 and 108 for libraries: 
 
The Register of Copyrights has recommended that the committee report describe the 
relationship between this section and the provisions of section 108 relating to reproduction by 
libraries and archives. The doctrine of fair use applies to library photocopying, and nothing 
contained in section 108 “in any way affects the right of fair use.” No provision of section 108 is 
intended to take away any rights existing under the fair use doctrine. To the contrary, section 
108 authorizes certain photocopying practices which may not qualify as a fair use.34 
 
This serves to reiterate Williams’ recognition of the unique status of libraries and their importance 
to society.  The second, less deferential provision, is from the Senate Report on 108: 
 
Subsection (g)… does not authorize the related or concerted reproduction of multiple copies of 
the same material whether made on one occasion or over a period of time, and whether 
intended for aggregate use by one individual or for separate use by the individual members of a 
group. For example, if a college professor instructs his class to read an article from a copyrighted 
journal, the school library would not be permitted, under subsection (g), to reproduce copies of 
the article for the members of the class. 
 
While it is not possible to formulate specific definitions of “systematic copying,” the following 
examples serve to illustrate some of the copying prohibited by subsection (g).  
                                                          
33 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
34 Supra note 13 at 74. 
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1. A library with a collection of journals in biology informs other libraries with similar collections 
that it will maintain and build its own collection and will make copies of articles from these 
journals available to them and their patrons on request. Accordingly, the other libraries 
discontinue or refrain from purchasing subscriptions to these journals and fulfill their patrons’ 
requests for articles by obtaining photocopies from the source library. 
2. A research center employing a number of scientists and technicians subscribes to one or two 
copies of needed periodicals. By reproducing photocopies of articles the center is able to make 
the material in these periodicals available to its staff in the same manner which otherwise would 
have required multiple subscriptions. 
3. Several branches of a library system agree that one branch will subscribe to particular 
journals in lieu of each branch purchasing its own subscriptions, and the one subscribing 
branch will reproduce copies of articles from the publication for users of the other 
branches.35 
 
Though legislative history is not binding, the examples provided by the Senate were illuminating in 
light of the Williams case, as it signaled that the use that had been deemed fair in that case perhaps 
should not have been.  Even as the Senate made these determinations, it recognized that libraries 
were evolving and that Congress would need more guidance on these issues. Congress subsequently 
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 
an attempt to bring greater resolution to technology and copyright.36  Unfortunately, CONTU 
encountered the same difficulties that Congress had. Technologies were still rapidly changing, so 
much so that it was impossible to come to agreement on terms that would survive their evolution. 
 
The House and Senate Reports also provide libraries with clues on how Congress viewed libraries 
and copyright in this era. Congress used language in 108 that intentionally broadened protections 
for libraries beyond those available for other entities.  The language adopted also almost exclusively 
dealt with one of the six rights --- reproduction. Clearly, Congress was primarily concerned about the 
commercial impact of reproduction as opposed to rights related to distribution or derivative works, 
issues that would later become as important. 
 
Sony (1984-1993) 
 
In 1984, Sony dramatically changed the view of fair use.  In this case, the court had to determine 
whether Sony’s marketing and selling of the Betamax recorder, a device designed to duplicate 
copyrighted works (i.e., television programs), was copyright infringement.37 The Sony court made three 
valuable contributions to fair use in its decision, at least in relation to libraries and their uses of 
technology.  First, as noted in the description of the factors above, wholesale copying of a work was 
                                                          
35 S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1976) at pages 70-71 
36 Public Law 93-573 
37 Supra note 30. 
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once presumptively unfair.  Sony was the case that modified this factor, acknowledging that copying the 
whole of a work could be fair under certain circumstances.38  Second was its recognition that 
technologies used to infringe can also have substantial non-infringing uses, and that removing the 
technology from the market because of infringing uses could inflict great societal harm.39 Balancing 
these interests, the Court permitted the technology (i.e., Betamax recorder) to continue to be 
distributed and set the precedent for newer technologies to receive the same treatment. Last, the Sony 
court made it more difficult to prevail in  copyright infringement cases where the use was non-
commercial by stating that “[a] challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof 
either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”40  This is a higher burden than mere substitution, 
as the copies made in this case clearly could substitute for the original.  
 
Thanks to the Sony holding, companies developing and improving equipment for mass reproduction – 
like high-speed digitization equipment --- prospered.   
 
Campbell (1994-2013) 
 
While the term “transformative use” was coined before Campbell,41 Campbell marked the point at 
which transformative use became a common element in the analysis of fair use’s factor one.42   The 
court in Campbell determined that 2 Live Crew’s parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” was fair use 
despite actual copying and a commercial purpose.  The heart of the court’s analysis rested on “whether 
the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or whether and to what extent it is 
“transformative,” altering the original with new expression, meaning, or message. The more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.” 43   
 
While the facts of Campbell do not generally apply to libraries, the concept of transformative use and its 
influence on fair use analyses are incredibly important not only to libraries but to all users in an era 
where technological advances made it easier to copy, manipulate, and use copyrighted works in unusual 
or unanticipated ways. The graphical web came into being in this time frame, as did Google and other 
major search engines, spawning a series of cases that would test the limits of fair use as applied to 
innovative technologies. 
 
                                                          
38 Supra note 30 at 450 (“Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work, 
see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), and that timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited 
to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see id., at § 107(3), does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use.”) 
39 Id. at 456 
40 Id. at 451 
41 Twin Peaks Production Inc. v. Publications Intern, Inc., 996 F.2d 1366 (1993); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics 
Corp, 758 F. Supp. 1522 (1991). 
42 Supra note 17 at 737. 
43 Supra note 25 at 569. 
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The most notable of these were Arriba Soft44 and Perfect 10,45 both of which involved search engines 
which crawled the web and displayed thumbnails of images on other websites in their search results.  In 
Arriba Soft, the program downloaded the full-sized picture, generated smaller thumbnails to display in 
search results, and then deleted the full-sized pictures from their servers.  Clicking on any of the 
thumbnails would in-line link to the full-sized image.  Google Images’ caching of webpages and search of 
images was the dispute in Perfect 10. The plaintiffs in both cases alleged copyright infringement of 
copyright owners’ reproduction, display, and/or distribution rights.   Since the purpose of both services 
was to improve access to information not to create artistic expressions, most of the uses in both cases 
were determined to be transformative and fair. 
 
These cases combined established a foundation on which libraries and other entities built larger 
digitization projects.  The courts recognized that copyrighted works combined could serve needs beyond 
those met by each individual work and that such a combination could produce a transformative work 
benefitting the public and deserving of special consideration in copyright infringement cases.  How 
entities used these concepts to digitize and make available library collections is covered in the next 
section. 
 
Before moving to that section, though, it is necessary to note that despite the steps forward in the 
evolution of fair use doctrine, this era also dealt a setback to libraries in the form of a 1994 case similar 
to Williams, but with a notably different outcome.  Texaco employed hundreds of researchers and its 
library ran a routing and photocopying service nearly identical to the one run by NIH in Williams.46  The 
primary difference between the two cases was purpose, with NIH performing research services for the 
government and Texaco researching to improve its commercial performance in the petroleum industry.  
Texaco was found to be liable for copyright infringement, causing some concern and confusion among 
libraries. In both Williams and Texaco, library staff provided copies of journal articles for researchers. 
The only distinction was in the nature of each entity’s business. Given how divided the Williams court 
was and the subsequent Senate Report with language on what should not count as fair use, the Texaco 
decision made some libraries question if their routing and copying practices were protected or not.   
 
HathiTrust (2014-) 
 
A series of recent cases builds on the cases in earlier years to make up our present fair use era.   
 
The first of these cases was Authors Guild v. HathiTrust.  HathiTrust is an organization formed by the 
libraries that participated in the Google Books project and was founded with the purpose of preserving 
library materials.  Participating libraries deposit their works with HathiTrust, which indexes and stores 
the works within its repository. It allows all users to search the materials stored, but only owning 
libraries to view the full-text.  Search results note in which works, on what pages, and with what 
                                                          
44 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (2002). 
45 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146 (2007). 
46 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (1994). 
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frequency the search term(s) are located, but do not display the full-text of the items themselves.  
Plaintiffs filed suit against HathiTrust and its member libraries, claiming copyright infringement in the 
use and storage of materials.  The court determined that the digitization and storage of copyrighted 
works was fair use, as was the use of the digitized works in a database, so long as the full-text of the 
works remained unseen by the public.  Since HathiTrust’s database did not supply full-text access to 
works to anyone other than those supported by section 121, its services were not seen to substitute for 
original works in a way that would create market harm. 
 
For digitization efforts, this ruling brought greater clarity on permitted uses of copyrighted works.  The 
HathiTrust court had pronounced that “the creation of a full-text searchable database is a 
quintessentially transformative use,”47 and that in such cases, the other factors in the fair use inquiry 
would be given less weight. The court had also recognized that in order to create a fully searchable 
database, it was necessary for the libraries to make copies of the full texts of the works, and that this 
wholesale copying was permitted under fair use.48  And, finally, the last part of the holding repudiated of 
the authors’ claim that storage of these works in multiple sites was prohibited by copyright.49 Libraries’ 
reproduction and storage of multiple copies served efficiency and preservation interests and therefore 
were not seen as infringing.   
 
The second case in the series was Cambridge University Press, in which Georgia State University 
operated two services where digitized or e-copies of works were posted online for student use.  One 
was an e-reserves system where materials were uploaded by libraries, and the second was a course 
management system where faculty uploaded works themselves. In both cases, access to the works were 
restricted to the students enrolled in the respective courses and works could not be uploaded until 
faculty had completed a fair use analysis.   While this court remanded the fair use analysis to the lower 
court, it did make several pronouncements that are relevant to library digitization processes. The first 
was resolving the seeming conflict between the Williams and Texaco cases.  The court here explicitly 
noted that nonprofit educational use may be granted greater protections than the same actions by for-
profit entities, even when the educational institution might derive some indirect profits from their 
actions.50 The second was a firm reiteration that the four factors are neither exclusive51 nor intended to 
be applied rigidly.52 
 
The last decision in the series was the Second Circuit’s in relation to the Google Books Project.  As 
Google displays more of a work than HathiTrust does, though still not full-text except with permission of 
                                                          
47 Authors Guild v HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 at 97 (2014). 
48 Id. at 98 (“Because it was reasonably necessary for the HDL to make use of the entirety of the works in order to 
enable the full-text search function, we do not believe the copying was excessive”) 
49 Id. at 99 (“We have no reason to think that these copies are excessive or unreasonable in relation to the 
purposes identified by the Libraries and permitted by the law of copyright. In sum, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Authors, the record demonstrates that these copies are reasonably necessary to 
facilitate the services HDL provides to the public and to mitigate the risk of disaster or data loss.”) 
50 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 at 1263-1267 (2014). 
51 Id. At 1282. 
52 Id. At 1258-1260. 
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the copyright owner, this case exerted greater pressure on the boundaries of fair use.  The authors 
raised arguments that had not appeared within HathiTrust, including claims that enabling search 
infringed on authors’ derivative rights, that snippets actually could serve as substitutes for original 
works, and that Google’s distribution of copies of digitized works to contributing libraries was infringing.  
The court summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s claim to have a derivative right in the search function as 
“an author's derivative rights do not include an exclusive right to supply information (of the sort 
provided by Google) about her works.”53  It also gave short shrift to the argument that Google’s snippet 
view substitutes for the original work, as there was no series of searches that would result in the 
entirety of a book being displayed.  Even though plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that they could 
view a fair amount of a book with some effort, the number of hours required to do this was seen to be 
so unusual as not to serve as a realistic portrayal of likely user behavior.   
The court found snippet views to be transformative as they provide context about a word that cannot be 
gained by the word alone54 and that “at least as presently structured by Google, the snippet view does 
not reveal matter that offers the marketplace a significantly competing substitute for the copyrighted 
work.”55 Further, despite recognizing that plaintiffs might indeed lose sales due to Google’s snippet 
views was insufficient to meet the test for substitution.56 Also important to digitization projects was the 
recognition  that libraries can use contractors or other entities to digitize their collection. 
The contract between Google and each of the participating libraries commits the library to use 
its digital copy only in a manner consistent with the copyright law, and to take precautions. In 
these circumstances, Google's creation for each library of a digital copy of that library's already 
owned book in order to permit that library to make fair use through provision of digital searches 
is not an infringement. If the library had created its own digital copy to enable its provision of 
fair use digital searches, the making of the digital copy would not have been infringement. Nor 
does it become an infringement because, instead of making its own digital copy, the library 
contracted with Google that Google would use its expertise and resources to make the digital 
conversion for the library's benefit.57 
Remaining copyright challenges for library digitization 
 
Returning now to the proposal to build a collaborative academic law library collection, we examine the 
challenges remaining even after Google. As a reminder, the proposal is to digitize collections to level the 
                                                          
53 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 at 207-208 (2015). 
54 Id. at 218. (”Google's division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show the searcher just enough context 
surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether the book falls within the scope of her interest 
(without revealing so much as to threaten the author's copyright interests). Snippet view thus adds importantly to 
the highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher.”) 
55 Id. at 222  
56 Id. at 224.  (“But the possibility, or even the probability or certainty, of some loss of sales does not suffice to 
make the copy an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth factor in favor of the rights 
holder in the original. There must be a meaningful or significant effect “upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.”) 
57 Id. At 229. 
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playing field for users searching for information and to more effectively collaborate on collection 
development, access, and maintenance.  
 
The legitimacy of the creation, storage, and use of searchable database from copyrighted materials is no 
longer in question, as both HathiTrust and Google have affirmed these uses as fair. Similarly, the issues 
surrounding the actual digitization process have been resolved.  Therefore, only one major challenge to 
fair use remains.  Throughout all case law, one principle remains intact, that a copy that supplants or 
substitutes for the original for the same purpose is not fair use.58 The one notable exception is in Sony, 
where copies of television programming made by private citizens in their own homes with recording 
technology was not considered to be infringing.  However, the analysis was limited solely to the 
recording function, and not the performance or distribution to others,59 so it has limited application in 
library digitization projects that include the goal of facilitating the lending of library materials.   
 
As we saw above, there have been cases where wholesale copying has occurred and been declared fair 
use --- Arribasoft and Perfect 10 being examples --- but in those cases, the digital originals were available 
freely on other sites, the copies were seen to be inferior to the originals, and therefore not substitutes. 
The proposal for a digital collaborative collection differs in that the originals are not freely available 
online, and the copies should not be inferior in quality to the originals, unless digital is seen to be 
inferior to print. 
 
This history and consistent messaging, though, should not discourage libraries from undertaking this 
project and risking litigation.  The reason this principle remains unchallenged is because no project has 
accomplished circulation of in-copyright digitized documents in a manner that comports with the spirit 
of copyright. The purpose and manner of use proposed for this collaborative collection differs from any 
other case heretofore before the courts, and therefore, it presents an issue of first impression on which 
libraries can press for a less cited but more appropriate test for fair use: “the use must be of a character 
                                                          
58 Folsom at 344–345 (“[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and truly to 
use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus 
cites the most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original 
work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.”); Harper & Row at 568 (fourth 
factor concerned with “use that supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work”) (emphasis 
added); HathiTrust at 95 (“A fair use must not excessively damage the market for the original by providing the 
public with a substitute for that original work.“); Google at 221, 223 (“The larger the amount, or the more 
important the part, of the original that is copied, the greater the likelihood that the secondary work might serve as 
an effectively competing substitute for the original, and might therefore diminish the original rights holder's sales 
and profits” and “on whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing substitute for the original, or its 
derivative, so as to deprive the rights holder of significant revenues because of the likelihood that potential 
purchasers may opt to acquire the copy in preference to the original”); Williams at 1366 (“It is undisputed that the 
photocopies in issue here were exact duplicates of the original articles; they were intended to be substitutes for 
and they served the same purpose as the original articles. They were copies of complete copyrighted works within 
the meaning of Sections 3 and 5 of the Copyright Act. This is the very essence of wholesale copying and, without 
more, defeats the defense of fair use.”) 
59 Supra note 30 at 425. 
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that services the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without 
excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”60 
 
The current four prongs for fair use analysis have increasingly shown their age and inability to adapt to 
technology, and it often feels as if courts are obligated to go through the analysis even when they know 
that the only elements are the first and fourth factors.  The second and third prong are largely irrelevant 
in cases of digitization, with almost all cases turning on the transformative nature of the use and 
commercial impact.  In discussion of transformative use, Courts struggle to distinguish between 
transformative uses justifying a fair use defense and the right to make derivative works, which belongs 
exclusively to the copyright owner.  Recent cases have shown how challenging this division is, never 
quite coming up with a satisfying or clear distinction.  The courts in HathiTrust and Google both made 
the attempt, but because both of their premises are easily overcome, demonstrate their ineffectiveness. 
 
The court in HathiTrust based its transformative assessment on a belief that “[t]here is no evidence that 
the Authors write with the purpose of enabling text searches of their books.”61 However, there are 
books that are indexed in detail. If authors could prove that they did write with such an intent, but just 
executed it poorly, would the analysis of transformative use have changed?  Many authors write books 
without intending them to be adapted into movies, and yet when they are so adapted, that adaptation 
is considered a derivative right.    
 
The court in Google picked up where HathiTrust left off, basing its reasoning on what it felt were the 
differences between transformative uses qualifying as fair use and infringement of derivative rights: 
 
 A further complication that can result from oversimplified reliance on whether the copying 
involves transformation is that the word “transform” also plays a role in defining “derivative 
works,” over which the original rights holder retains exclusive control…The statute defines 
derivative works largely by example, rather than explanation. The examples include “translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgement, condensation,” to which list the statute adds “any other form in 
which a work may be ... transformed.”..As we noted in Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 
“[p]aradigmatic examples of derivative works include the translation of a novel into another 
language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book 
or an audiobook.” … While such changes can be described as transformations, they do not 
involve the kind of transformative purpose that favors a fair use finding. The statutory definition 
suggests that derivative works generally involve transformations in the nature of changes of 
form”62 
 
                                                          
60 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 at 1110 (1990). 
61 Supra note 47 at 97. 
62 Supra note 53 at 215-216 
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The court then continues with the seemingly devastating statement, “If Plaintiffs' claim were based on 
Google's converting their books into a digitized form and making that digitized version accessible to the 
public, their claim would be strong.”63  Taken to its conclusion, building a collaborative digital library 
would be doomed. Not only is it a change in form, which falls squarely into the court’s definition of a 
derivative work, but if libraries were to lend materials to all of their users, the public could very well be 
part of that group.   I do not think that this is what was intended by the court. 
 
By resetting the fair use test to the principles in the Copyright Clause instead of using the section 107 
test, courts would be free to advance the two principles that animated copyright in a meaningful way 
even in an age of rapid technological change.  Courts should be able to recognize that a shift in form and 
making such a form available to others even beyond the §121 exception can serve a public good and can 
be legitimate in a world where technology changes daily.  Failure to do so creates a windfall for authors 
that was never intended at the time of the nation’s founding. Copyright laws assume that an economic 
incentive is needed for creation of new works, but that economic incentive should not be multiplied 
simply by the introduction of new technology.  Otherwise, each time a technology dies and is replaced 
by another, the author could sell the same work to the same buyer.  That may produce a greater 
economic incentive to create, but it also causes large negative market effects in that users would need 
to invest more funds in the same work instead of spreading that investment over multiple works. 
Ultimately, this approach would undermine the societal benefit interests inherent to copyright. 
 
Our hypothetical digital library would only permit circulation of copies equal to those that had been 
purchased by the participating libraries.  Circulating a digitized version of a book does not expand a 
library’s authority beyond the uses contemplated at initial purchase of the print title.  A library can lend 
such an item to its own patrons through regular circulation processes and to another library through 
interlibrary loan. Executing these functions online, therefore, creates no market harm beyond 
efficiencies created by faster loaning and return.  At its most basic, format shifting is not transformative, 
nor is the circulation of a digital item. Both serve the same function and purpose as existed with the 
original print book.  Under traditional 107 analysis, then, this project could fail.  For society’s benefit, it 
should not.   
 
Returning again to the Copyright Clause, the project above does nothing to harm incentive to authors, as 
authors still get paid for the creation of their works.  There is no increase of the number of copies to the 
market, as the number of works circulated remains the same.   
 
Courts should be encouraged to take a step back from Section 107 and look to the purpose of copyright 
in determining fair use. Failing that, they should be reminded that the four prongs in Section 107 are not 
exclusive. If not exclusive, then another factor should be introduced to the analysis: equity.  Libraries’ 
resources are not unlimited and it makes no economic sense that they should have to spend scarce 
resources on the same material multiple times because of technology changes. They should be able to 
use the materials that they purchase fully in any technological era, regardless of the prevailing format.   
                                                          
63 Id. at 226. 
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If both resetting the fair use test and the addition of a factor fails, libraries should then argue for a more 
nuanced test for the fourth factor.  Instead of barring from fair use a copy that supplants or substitutes 
for the original for the same purpose, courts should adopt instead a test that sets a higher bar.  For 
example, they could say that it is not fair use to create a copy that expands the number available in the 
market when the new copy which supplants or substitutes for the original for the same purpose.  Or that 
mere substitution isn’t enough but whether the substitution is unfair. 
 
Under any of these three approaches, the project described above can flourish, for the benefit of society 
while still providing remuneration to authors.  Books relevant to a researcher could be more easily 
identified and more quickly obtained.  Books, whether out-of-print or within print, would be readily 
available to interested scholars, and law faculty and students nationwide would have access to the same 
resources, elevating the level of scholarship beyond. While there might be a market effect, due to 
technological efficiencies, it is not a market effect that thwarts the goals of copyright. 
 
There likely would be resistance because of potential aftereffects.  The first objection would be if 
libraries can do this, then why not the public at large? If the public at large can do this, then would the 
action invite a Napster-like community of pirates?  Since all of the approaches above require control of 
the work and no additional copies to the market, this fear, while real, is fairly easily answered.  Unless 
any actor controls the item digitized, they would be subject to a copyright infringement suit where the 
affirmative defense of fair use would fail.   
 
The second is that if format shifting is permitted, would this disadvantage authors and provide a windfall 
to publishers who could then shift a book into a new format without negotiating new terms?  Practically 
speaking, foreseeable uses have been a part of copyright law for some time, and since a series of cases 
in the late 1990s through early 2000s,64 publishers and agents representing authors in negotiation have 
been particularly careful of licensing language restricting or permitting certain uses.  As parties are 
always free to waive their fair use rights, should a publisher and author agree to limit publication to a 
given format, contract would prevail over any fair use claim.   
 
This test brings copyright and fair use back full circle, to the Copyright Clause and its two principles to 
provide incentives to authors while stimulating societal development.  The type of project described in 
this article arguably meets that test.  It does not diminish the incentive for authors to create, as libraries 
will continue to select and buy materials. It just seeks to expand access to the materials in a manner that 
is consistent with current library services and practices. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
64 Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (1998) (noting that when “a license 
includes a grant of rights that is reasonably read to cover a new use (at least where the new use was foreseeable at 
the time of contracting), the burden of excluding the right to the new use will rest on the grantor”); Random 
House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, 150 F.Supp.2d 613 (2001) (holding that restrictive terminology in a license 
agreement prevented new, foreseeable uses that fell outside of the accepted definition of that term) 
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While there are many factors to consider in library digitization projects --- costs, preservation, migration, 
integration with discovery platforms, document control, security, privacy --- copyright should not be one 
of the issues that prevents forward movement.  In order to advance societal interests, libraries and 
universities should be willing to engage in activities designed to test fair use and challenge courts to 
recognize that even non-transformative, substitute uses can be fair. 
 
